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Critical Legal Studies versus Critical Legal 
· Theory: A Comment on Method 
FRANK MUNGER and CARROLL SERON 
Over the last decade the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CCLS) has 
rekindled an important debate about the study of legal ideologies. The work by 
scholars within this movement is provocative because it demands that we take 
seriously the contradictory needs and ideological parameters of liberal legalism. 
The growing body of work associated with this movement has not, however, 
included a criticism of the ideological underpinnings of legal methods in general 
and doctrinal analysis in particular. We begin with the premise that scholarship 
must include a self-critical method. 
In Part I-The Political-Economic Constraints of Liberal Legal Scho-
larship-we explore why questions of methods, i.e. of how one asks and answers 
questions, has not been a central issue within CCLS. In Part /I-Reformulation 
of Method-we present a beginning toward a framework for developing a 
self-critical method for understanding legal ideologies. 
A central concern of progressive socio-legal studies is to unravel the ideolo-
gy of legal institutions. In what ways do legal institutions cloud understand-
ing of social processes and simultaneously, provide a seedbed for progres-
sive social change? Since law may be viewed as a source of alienation and 
oppression in contemporary society, transformative political goals include 
discovering how law can further reconstruction of social relations in ways 
which are not oppressive or alienating. It is this question, we believe, that 
attracts many scholars to the social study of law. Yet as we begin to explore 
avenues for study, the complexity of the task often seems overwhelming. 
In the last decade, however, a group of legal scholars has tacked this 
question. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CCLS) was organized 
by a group of scholars to "demystify" liberal legalism. 1 As a progressive 
movement the Conference has promoted a critique of law and legal ideology 
that suggests possibilities for transforming society. Building upon the 
groundwork laid by Legal Realism, the common thread of this loosely 
connected movement has been to document and to map the incoherent and 
illogical underpinnings of liberal legalism which reveal the myriad ways in 
which law legitimates inherently unequal social relations. In recent years 
this critique has taken a central place in socio-legal studies and now consti-
tutes a leading edge in scholarship (for a further discussion, see Unger, 
1983). 
We were drawn to the work of the scholars within this movement because 
they are asking the important questions. As we read this work, however, a 
LAW & POLICY, Vol. 6 No. 3, July 1984 
© 1984 Basil Blackwell ISSN 0265-8240 $3. 00 
258 LAW & POLICY July 1984 
problem emerged: repeatedly, the work revealed little, if any, questioning 
of doctrinal methods for doing research. We found recurrently that the 
substance of Conference research was quite different from more conven-
tional legal scholarship but that its form, the law review article, was remark-
ably similar to its conventional cousin. 
This troubled us. How can one do critical scholarship without questioning 
conventional methods? How can one do critical scholarship without con-
sidering one's role as a scholar engaged in a social enterprise? This paper, 
then, is about method. 
Part One presents the methods of conventional legal scholarship. Here, 
we begin by considering the role of scholarship in the socio-historical context 
of legal education and elaborate three methodological constraints: (1) legal 
scholarship is defined by the study of doctrine and, therefore, is centered on 
cases, statutes, and rules; (2) when legal scholarship moves beyond the 
examination of doctrine it does so for one purpose, substantiation of a 
preconceived position about the meaning of the doctrine under study; and 
(3) legal scholars write exclusively for other legal scholars. We then present 
the work of CCLS and demonstrate that it, too, exhibits repeatedly the 
limitations of conventional scholarship. Thus we draw an explicit parallel 
between characteristics of conventional legal scholarship and critical legal 
studies. While readers may disagree with the force of the parallel, the point 
is simple. In choosing to meet conventional legal scholars on their own 
ground, members of the Conference have assimilated critical studies to 
methods of conventional research. As a result, some of the normative and 
theoretical assumptions which limit the range and penetration of conven-
tional research re-emerge in CCLS research. 
Part Two presents a beginning toward the difficult task of developing a 
critical method for understanding the ideology of liberal legalism. Here, we 
begin with the work of the Frankfurt School; we find this an informative 
place to start because this tradition provides methodological strategies built 
upon theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation by researchers 
committed to self-criticism and self-reflection. Thus we show that critical 
theory presents a method, a framework for asking questions about legal 
ideologies, that moves beyond the confines of normative social science and 
legal methods. To document the force of a critical method, in the final 
section of Part Two we return to the work of CCLS and present the steps that 
must be taken to understand the ideology of liberal legalism. 
I. THE POLITJCAL-ECONOMICCONSTRAINTS OF LIBERAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Why has it been so difficult for CCLS to move beyond the "mapping" of 
doctrine? Why has the Conference separated itself from other progressive 
movements by refusing to join in the elaboration of a theory of political 
economy (Tushnet, 1978)? To answer these questions we begin by consider-
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ing the origins of CCLS in the law school, in the hierarchical environment of 
legal education with its emphasis upon professionalism (Konefsky and 
Schlegel, 1982; Priest, 1983). We describe conventional legal method as an 
outgrowth of the ideology of liberal legal education. Conference research 
often resembles conventional legal scholarship. As we explain at length in 
this section, conventional doctrinal analysis (1) assumes the autonomy of 
legal doctrine from its historical context; (2) is result-oriented and as such a 
poor method of theory testing; and (3) pays limited attention to the role of 
any legal process other than appellate advocacy, thereby largely ignoring 
significant aspects of legal practice. The failure to progress beyond demys-
tifying legal doctrine arises in part from reliance on an inappropriate 
"method" for selecting and analyzing issues. 
A. The Elite Law School 
Mirroring trends in contemporary society, the development of modern 
secondary and professional education may be described as a process of 
increasing specialization, segmentation of disciplines (followed by seg-
mentation of sub-disciplines) (Wiebe, 1967), professionalization, and strati-
fication (Collins, 1979; Veysey, 1965; Laumann and Heinz, 1977; Kennedy, 
1982).2 
Legal education, even in its elitist mold, is the business of training 
lawyers; this means that law schools specialize in training people to "think 
like a lawyer," i.e., to take a position (usually with the interests of a "client" 
in mind), to develop a well-conceived and tight argument backed up with 
legal decisions that persuasively substantiate the validity of one's argument. 
In the process of imparting this skill one learns that those who are "best" at 
this specialization are those who can develop an argument, backed up by a 
tight analysis of legal precedent, in support of any and al/positions. 3 
At elite law schools, however, there is the presumption that the credential 
itself will stamp one a lawyer; in fact, one feature of these schools' elitist 
persona is that they believe they are above imparting the law unadorned. 4 
Thus in the "top" law schools one finds courses on law and economics, the 
history of Chinese law, or the sociology of law, one finds historians, 
sociologists, economists and neo-Marxist legal scholars on the faculty, and it 
is assumed all are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. 5 
Yet, no matter how much lip service is paid to the notion that legal 
education can broaden and develop the Jaw student, one must nevertheless 
depart the ivy-covered walls of the law school knowing how to "think like a 
lawyer." This means that attention must be given to the specialized, profes-
sional training of a lawyer, albeit in an elite and "cultured" form. In sum, 
while elite law schools impart a much broader, even "experimental," educa-
tion, it is still, and most importantly, an education in doctrinal analysis-
learning how to work with the development of appellate precedents and 
doctrine. 
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This development has left an interesting contradiction in elite law schools 
between their wiIJingness to include new or experimental areas of legal 
research in the curriculum and the assumption that such schools must teach 
their students the skills of "lawyering" better than those who attend less elite 
institutions (Priest, 1983). This tension is addressed by emphasizing legal 
method regardless of the subject area. Legal reasoning, i.e., argument 
grounded in legal authority, is presented as an apolitical, value-neutral 
method (Kennedy, 1982). Thus it is assumed that one who graduates from 
an elite law school need not have bothered learning the content of, for 
example, marriage and family law, but that one does know how, in the 
abstract, to construct the best legal argument. 
B. Legal Scholarship as Legal Brief 
The emphasis placed on legal method in elite law schools has significant 
implications for legal scholarship. 6 Legal scholarship is in fact a sophisti-
cated and elaborated form of legal brief. Doctrinal analysis, the chief 
method for legal scholarship, is undertaken to establish a particular inter-
pretation of case law on the basis of arguments and authority which would be 
acceptable to an appellate judge. As a method of inquiry, conventional legal 
scholarship serves the narrow professional function of supporting lawyers' 
advocacy. At least three characteristics of conventional legal scholarship are 
entailed by this function. We emphasize these because, as we demonstrate in 
the next section, all three also characterize critical legal studies. 
First, conventional research is primarily, though not exclusively, focused 
on doctrine-cases, statutes, and treatises. Doctrine is of primary interest 
because normatively it is the basis for legal system behavior (Abel, 1980). 7 
This limitation of focus within mainstream legal scholarship reflects not only 
the normative basis for liberal legal method, but also the assumptions about 
the role of the legal system that are acceptable within liberal ideology. 
Doctrinal analysis assumes that neither the political origins of rules nor the 
way in which decisions may ultimately redistribute benefits or burdens has 
relevance in a legal decision. The processes that produce rules and policies in 
cases are treated as if they do not matter, and most legal scholarship treats 
the effects of decisions as if law will be translated into behavior. It is assumed 
that the relationship between the legal system and other social behavior is 
either unproblematic or can be rendered unproblematic through in-
cremental improvements. The effects of legal intervention are assumed to 
be rational, beneficial, and predictable. Legal scholarship is focused pri-
marily on problems of rational extension and reconciliation of rules and 
policies which are present within cases. That this paradigm for legal decision 
is continually breaking down, widely viewed with skepticism and universally 
violated does not detract from the fact that it exercises a powerful limiting 
effect on arguments made to courts and thus on legal scholarship generally. 
The function of the normative premise and of the embedded descriptive 
assumptions underlying legal scholarship is to keep the research at home-
.. 
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focused on case law and not on issues which render the process of decision 
questionable and over which the practicing lawyer, judge, and scholar are 
presumed to have no control. 
Second, when conventional legal scholarship does draw upon sources 
beyond doctrine, it does so for one purpose: further substantiation of a 
preconceived position about the development of the rules under study. 
Various types of presentation of legal arguments may be thought of along a 
continuum from conventional legal arguments substantiated by cases/prece-
dents to arguments (usually scholarship) incorporating ideas from other 
disciplines. Incorporation of social science findings, constructs, or theories 
is, from the vantage point of doctrinal method, simply another form of 
evidence to support conclusions already grounded in existing legal doctrine. 
When developed in this mode, the law review article often contains both 
"the case analysis and the policy prescription" (Tushnet, 1981b: 1208). Thus 
... a- law journal might be described as a series of sophisticated legal briefs, 
often on fairly esoteric topics. Legal scholarship tends to use theories and 
research from other disciplines in a result-oriented way, rather than as tools 
for inquiry about the behavior of the legal system. In the more elite schools, 
the scholarly research that is produced tends to borrow ideas, constructs, 
and information from other disciplines, but such materials are inevitably 
used to support legal argument. 8 The question is rarely raised as to whether 
or not the work taken out of context has the same meaning or implications. 9 
Third, conventional legal scholarship self-consciously addresses a narrow 
audience: other legal scholars and appellate practitioners for whom doc-
trine is important. The origins and significance of legal rules, policies or 
behavior are taken for granted; they are not exposed and explored. Among 
scholars it is assumed that doctrine is the principal focus of lawyers' efforts to 
assist clients. Doctrine is viewed as the centerpiece of policy making, the 
source of the effects produced by the legal system. A practitioner adds only 
technique. Practice is not viewed, then, as a method of "testing" the 
strength or validity of doctrinal constructions (but see Handler, 1978). 
Liberal scholarship downplays both the importance of the relationship 
between doctrine and society as a separate object of study and the import-
ance of the members of the profession who actually mediate this rela-
tionship. Finally, doctrinal analysis is inaccessible to members of other 
professions; hence, the theoretical and behavioral assumptions embedoed 
in legal scholarship are unlikely to undergo scrutiny. 
Of course, these three issues within conventional doctrinal analysis are 
not new; debates concerning these limitations date from at least the turn of 
the century and came into bold relief during the New Deal (Gordon, 1975). 
In the area of legal scholarship specifically, substantiation of a position 
through the borrowing of information and/or constructs from other disci-
plines is first seen in the work of the Legal Realists. The Legal Realists 
attempted to open up legal scholarship by demanding that law be analyzed 
as part of a socio-political institution. 10 In taking this step, they challenged 
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the then-dominant ideology of legal formalism and, at the same time, 
suggested an important agenda for cross-disciplinary work between the 
then-emerging social sciences and law. However, there has been much 
criticism of the realists and their progeny because they often came to 
"believe" in the scientism of these emerging social sciences (Schlegel, 1980) 
while, at the same time, continuing to use legal "method" and reasoning to 
present their position. Seen in a larger context, the realists suffered from the 
disciplinary blinders created by a specialized, professionalized, and 
apparently systematized organization of education: while they tried, they 
did not break out of the mold of legal scholarship summed up in a method of 
legal argumentation (see Hunt, 1978). 11 
The pressures within professional law schools to engage in the perpetua-
tion of conventional legal research are great. In fact, prestige and tenure are 
earned on the basis of how well one does this type of research. Not only is 
.there enormous pressure to be conventional, it must also be recognized that 
doctrinal analysis is intrinsically a method of research that legitimates liberal 
legalism. 
C. A Critique of the CCLS Critique 
CCLS has set for itself an agenda to document the ideological force of liberal 
legalism. The body of work produced by the Conference has centered on 
contemporary doctrinal issues, namely, private law (Horwitz, 1977), labor 
law (Klare, 1978; Stone, 1981), civil rights (Freeman, 1978), and welfare 
rights (Simon, 1978; but see Sparer, 1984), as well as more abstract debates 
in jurisprudence (Kennedy, 1976; Unger, 1983), feminist issues (see e.g., 
MacKinnon, 1982a, 1982b), and law and economics (see e.g., Kelman, 
1979). 12 Unlike conventional work on these issues, however, research by 
members of the Conference has emphasized a systematic and self-conscious 
understanding of the ideological role of law in a capitalist society. 13 In this 
way the Conference departs sharply from mainsteam legal research. While 
mainstream research implicitly legitimates legal process, the explicit goal of 
the Conference is to delegitimate legal process by documenting the incoher-
ence of doctrine. In undertaking this task, however, the Conference has 
assumed that the role of legal ideology can be explained through a close 
reading of selected case law and that there is no need concretely and 
historically to sort out its impact or self-critically to examine the methods 
employed in one's research. Notwithstanding the clearly stated objectives of 
the Conference, we must ask to what extent the work of CCLS contributes to 
o
1
ur understanding of the ideological role of law in a liberal capitalist state. 
Liberal legal method continues to inform the work of CCLS. Beneath the 
surface of the Conference's attempt to undermine liberal legalism, there is, 
in fact, the same paradigm for research. Echoing the conventions of tradi-
tional legal research, three specific attributes persist in the work of the Con-
ference: 1) the assumed autonomy of legal doctrine, 2) the argumentative 
use of theory, and 3) the targeting of an exclusive audience in a way which 
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leaves practitioners and others largely on the outside of Conference debates. 
1. The Autonomy of Doctrine: To date, a primary objective of CCLS 
research has been to undermine liberal theory of legal doctrine by demon-
strating that on its own terms doctrinal development is essentially incohe-
rent, illogical, and irrational. 14 In pursuing this task members of the Confer-
ence have, like their liberal counterparts, limited their selection of evidence 
to doctrine, cases, rules, and statutes. The concern to meet mainstream 
scholarship on its own terrain may, in part, explain this focus. Regardless of 
this rationale, however, the end result is a body of research that reinforces 
the very assumption it sets out to demystify, i.e., that doctrine develops 
autonomously, albeit incoherently. Some members of the Conference have 
sought to examine the ideological significance of legal doctrine without 
reference to any economic or political environment within which legal 
doctrine evolves; this, we refer to as the "nihilist" strand. Other members of 
the Conference, in various ways and from various vantage points, have 
sought to couch their work on method and doctrine in a larger historical 
context as well as within a theoretical and critical framework; these we refer 
to as the "totalistic" and "normative effects" strands. But elaboration of the 
ideological role of law, even in these terms, continues to rely upon the 
evidence provided through doctrinal analysis of appellate decisions alone. 
Just as liberal method subsumes a theory of the relationship between law 
and society and the relationship of law practice to legal doctrine, so the 
methods of analysis employed by CCLS members have had a similar effect 
on their interpretation of legal theory and practice (for e.g. to contrary, see 
Spence, 1982). Thus there has, for example, been little consideration of the 
extent to which the law is an active and direct force in generating class 
conflict; rather, the production of doctrine at the appellate level has been 
considered as a self-contained process. The end result is a body of research 
that reinforces the very assumption it sets out to demystify, i.e., that doctrine 
develops autonomously. 
a) The "Nihilist" Strand of Research: For some leading members of the 
Conference the primary objective of research is to "take the doctrinal 
content of law seriously on its own terms" as an object of study (Gordon, 
n.d.). In this research the evolution of legal doctrine and legal theory is 
explained as a process driven by the internal contradictions of liberal legal 
theory. This research rejects purely logical or "natural" (Kennedy, 1979) 
explanations of the development of legal theory on the one hand and all 
"instrumentalist" theories of legal evolution on the other, including both 
interest group theory and reductionist Marxist explanations of legal 
doctrine. 15 As the problems of offering a coherent explanation of the 
significance of legal doctrine "on its own terms" have become more and 
more complex, the task of relating legal ideology to socio-political context 
has not only been postponed, but declared inappropriate for current consid-
eration. Describing his analysis of the thought of William Blackstone, 
Kennedy explained his focus on doctrine in this way: 
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My focus on interpreting the larger framework as simultaneous mediation and 
legitimation means that what I have to say is descriptive, and descriptive only 
of thought. It means ignoring the question of what brings a legal consciousness 
into being, what causes it to change, and what effect it has on the actions of 
those who live it. My only justification for these omissions is that we need to 
understand far more than we now do about the content and the internal 
structure of legal thought before we can hope to link it in any convincing way to 
other aspects of social, political or economic life ... Given this limitation of 
focus, it would be a delusion to think that the study of the history and 
prehistory of our contradictory feelings can resolve the contradiction, provide 
a basis for political action, or even help us in the task of formulating and 
reformulating our goal. ... (Kennedy, 1979: 220-221). 
While acknowledging a commitment to humanitarian reform, this line of 
analysis isolates socio-political context from liberal legal contradictions. 16 
Further, statements like the one just quoted tend to deny the value of 
exploring theory which does link legal ideology to other aspects of social, 
political or economic life. Instead, the nihilist research, in particular Ken-
nedy's discussion of contradiction in Blackstone's Commentaries, begins 
with a statement about universal and pervasive feelings of contradiction 
which are "an aspect of our experience of every form of social life" (Ken-
nedy, 1979: 213). Assumptions of a universal human nature as a premise for 
arguments is a characteristic of philosophical idealism. While Kennedy 
derives this universal from social contradictions, the specific historical form 
of the contradiction does not enter into his analysis. Skeptical of all social 
theory, this strand of research assumes that a critique of liberal legalism can 
be undertaken without putting forward any social theory. In the case of 
"nihilist" research within the Conference, the absence of explicit social 
theory leaves the legal scholar secure in the faith that understanding doc-
trine on its own terins is the most important form of research,-in fact the only 
one which can be undertaken. 
b) The "Totalistic" Strand of Research: Members of the Conference who 
have sought to place their work in a larger theoretical and critical tradition 
share a belief that law must be understood as an ideology. Several leading 
Conference members employ a social theory derived from Sartre's existen-
tial-phenomenological Marxism. This theory begins with the notion that we 
make sense of the world by interpreting the material conditions of our 
existence. In the act of interpretation, social relationships are created, given 
meaning, and are instilled with particular characteristics. To analyze social 
relationships, the investigator mtist try to understand these interpretations 
and how they unfold. This starting point is common to a number of sociolo-
gical theories which are anti-positivist in orientation, including Critical 
Theory. The particular form of phehoinenology adopted by Conference 
scholars may be termed "totalistic" because of a further characteristic, 
namely a tendency to see social relations as part of a Hegelian system of 
ideas (Tushnet, n.d.; Gabel, 1982a). According to this formulation, the 
legal scholar, the "workers on the shop floor" (Trubek, 1984) and the 
Munger and Seron LEGAL STUDIES V. LEGAL THEORY 265 
investigator share the same consciousness of capitalist society because the 
primary factor shaping interpretations of the world is unitary, namely the 
material social relations of production. Since every piece of the network of 
social relationships created through consciousness of these forces is implied 
in every other piece, investigation of any particular piece will reveal as much 
about the common consciousness as investigation of any other piece. This 
approach has been used to justify examination of legal doctrine as if it were 
representative of a common consciousness shared by all members of a 
capitalist society. 
The first point to observe is that in this research legal doctrine is used as 
evidence of consciousness. Yet, in most of this research, it is the doctrine, in 
its own right, which the researcher seeks to explain, not the doctrine consi-
dered as one kind of evidence of the ideology or consciousness bf a particular 
group. Nor is it always clear which individuals are the focus of concern. 
Different individuals are the focus of the argument at different points. At 
one point it may be the judge since the consciousness of a judge creates legal 
opinions. In considering the significance of cases, however, the interpreta-
tion of the world which they reveal are said to reflect the will of a ruling class 
(Tushnet, 1981a: 30) or to reify forces affecting consumers, workers and 
others formally subject to law (Gabel, 1982a). Since these individuals are 
not subject to the same material forces that judges are, their interpretations 
of the world require a different process of understanding. Indeed, as this· 
analysis shows, there must be two separate elements in Marxist phe-
nomenology: (1) the state of individuals' consciousness of the world and (2) 
the manner iµ which consciousness is formed and expressed in behavior, 
including verbal behavior. 
Once the need for a second element (process) is perceived, totalistic 
theory leads in one of two directions. The first, more radical, alternative is to 
deny that the theory requires anything beyond the analysis of legal decisions 
and the structure of the ·consciousness they seem to imply. Phenomenologi-
cal accounts of social behavior frequently stop with analysis of the meaning of 
an individual's acts in the context in which they occur, without attempting to 
link them to larger patterns or to integrate the meaning attributed to social 
activity by individuals in widely dispersed settings. But the totalistic theory 
of Gabel and Tushnet asserts that a larger structure exists, which may be 
called capitalism, and that specific structures within capitalism also exist 
which have consistency arid meaning across widely diverse areas of conduct. 
Examples of such specific structures are class and legal ideology. Even if 
they did not assert that a larger structure exists, the claim that the role of 
legal ideology across areas of conduct can be understood by looking at 
doctrine alone is siinply implausible. The conditions of creation, mainte-
nance, and change in the meaning of material forces are concrete and 
specific. The position of the industrial worker is not the same as the position 
of the judge. Only general structural characteristics of ideologies are likely 
to be shared by individuals in very different situations (see Munger, 1983). 
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Different classes may appropriate quite different aspects of legal ideology, 
and what they appropriate may bear a very different relationship to behavior 
as a result of the various circumstances in which they exist (Mann, 1975). 
Radical totalistic theory simply cannot explain enough. 
The second direction in which totalistic theory may proceed is to acknow-
ledge the presence of structures (i.e., capitalism, class, etc.) which form the 
elements of a theory of political economy. Indeed, this is the route followed 
in practice by CCLS writers. For example, the connections between material 
forces in capitalist society and consciousness are critical to Gabel's argument 
that legal reasoning "passivizes" individuals: 
Legal thought originates, of course, with the consciousness of the dominant 
class because it is in this class's interest to bring it into being, but it is accepted 
and interiorized by everyone because of the traumatic absence of conne.cted-
ness that would otherwise erupt into awareness (1982a: 263). 
This statement has meaning only within a theory in which classes exist, have 
identifiable interests, act as agents of those interests, and are oppressed by 
their own and others' actions, where oppression has the same meta-theore-
tical status as the concept of mental illness in the vocabulary of the therapist 
and therefore requires the same tentative understanding of "objective" 
human potentiality. Similarly, Tushnet's examination of the internal contra-
dictions of American legal ideology caused by the requirement that it 
reconcile the paternalism of slavery with the social relations of capitalism, 
requires a theory of political economy. 17 The elements of a political eco-
nomy which will support the homology between commodity and law are 
complex and require empirical evidence of processes ranging well beyond 
the interpretation of legal texts. 
We do not take issue here with phenomenological interpretations of 
Marxist theory. Our critique is a narrow one. Assertion that social rela-
tionships begin with the way people interpret the world is a plausible starting 
point for understanding ideologies. Yet, the totalistic view does not attempt 
to examine or to explain the origins of ruling class ideology, let alone its 
penetration outside the ruling class, as Tushnet concedes (1981a: n.54: 38). 
Totalistic theory leads either to a radical assertion of the autonomous 
development of doctrine, which we believe most members of the Confer-
ence reject in principal, or to a theory of political economy in which the 
creation and function of ideology are questions to be studied empirically. 
Gabel and Tushnet fail to examine the full implications of the theory. 
Totalistic theory implies a program of research well beyond the mapping of 
legal doctrine. Failure to undertake it is another example, we think, of 
lingering reluctance on the part of law professors to move beyond a tradi-
tional mode of legal scholarship. 
c) The "Normative Effects" Strand of Research: Still other work relying 
on theoretical traditions within Marxism acknowledge the importance of 
connections between historically situated social relations and legal ideology. 
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Thus some Conference research is intended to demonstrate that legal doc-
trine does not represent progress, or even-handed distribution of the be-
nefits and burdens of social life, or rational solutions to conflict, but that 
doctrine represents specifiable class interests. By relying exclusively upon 
doctrinal evidence, this research falls short of its own goals and, once again, 
implicitly rests upon the assumption that the law is autonomous. 
This strand of research by members of the Conference acknowledges that 
the connection between legal ideology and class relations in capitalist society 
is an essential element of any explanation of the evolution of legal doctrine 
(Horwitz, 1977; Klare, 1978; Freeman, 1978). Yet, in much of this work 
there is an unstated assumption that to call law an "ideology" is to evoke a 
known process of cause and effect in liberal capitalist society. This assumed 
process of cause and effect takes two forms. First, rules in the legal system 
(doctrine and cases) are assumed to have a direct impact on beliefs and, 
therefore, on actions of members of the society. Second, class struggle is 
assumed to have a direct impact on the evolution of rules, but this evolution 
always has the effect of undermining working class struggle, and this under-
mining process, through legitimation, inevitably recreates the status quo, 
i.e., there is no change, no progress in terms of a group's vision achieved, 
through struggle. 18 This research often focuses on the evolution of doctrine 
alone. The conditions of the evolution and the impact of feedback to the 
society from such evolution, though essential to the significance of doctrine, 
are not examined directly; rather, these authors invoke a vague, yet essen-
tial, correspondence between the socio-political context of legal doctrine 
and legal doctrine itself to justify the categories in terms of which the 
analysis proceeds and to explain both the evolution of doctrine and its effects 
outside the legal system. 
Two illustrations will make our observations more concrete. We select 
Alan Freeman's (1978) analysis of desegregation decisions by the Supreme 
Court and Karl Klare's (1978) examination of the Supreme Court's deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act. Freeman argues that decisions by the Supreme 
Court are part of the mechanism of social control which ultimately legiti-
mates and stabilizes class rule. An aroused minority proletariat mounted an 
intense civil rights campaign in the 1950s and 1960s. Pro-civil rights decisions 
of the Supreme Court, departing from liberal ideas of causation and respon-
sibility for injury, coincided with the most intense activity of the movement. 
Thereafter, the movement was deflected into the courts and the administra-
tive enforcement of legal remedies, and it declined in force. In the current 
period, the Supreme Court has returned to traditional concepts of cause and 
liability, undermining much of the earlier law. The focus of this research is 
on evolving Supreme Court doctrine, which is insightfully presented. But 
the links between decisions and movements should be critical to Freeman's 
argument. Far from proposing an analysis of legal doctrine on its own terms, 
Freeman acknowledges that in light of his "view that laws serve largely to 
legitimize the existing social structure and, especially, class relationships 
268 LAW & POLICY July 1984 
within that structure, the ultimate constraints are outside the legal system" 
(Freeman, 1978: 1051).Thus while the major emphasis of the work "is on 
how the process of legitimation works through the manipulation of doc-
trine" (Freeman, 1978: 1052), that process has meaning only in relation to a 
socio-historical context. To explain the connection between legal ideology 
and structures existing outside the law, Freeman describes two perspectives 
on discrimination-the "perpetrator" perspective and the "victim" perspec-
tive-which by implication are both manipulated by the Supreme Court and 
also reflect a consciousness of discrimination within the civil rights move-
ment itself. Thus the ideology generated by the Supreme Court implicitly 
mediates class relations by providing interpretations of cause and effect. In a 
later article Freeman (1981) interprets his findings in this way: 
Those developments led me to conclude that the process by which the law 
absorbed the civil rights struggle, reprocessed it, and turned it out in recent 
cases is in some fashion a part of what may be called the legitimation process. 
Today's legal ideology pretends in many ways that racism has been cured, that 
the problem has been dealt with, that we can go on to other problems, that the 
legal rights that.have been created amount to sufficient equality or liberation 
for formerly oppressed people .... It seems to me· that, despite the massive 
struggles underlying the demand for civil rights reform, acceptance of that 
reform and the shape that it has ultimately taken must be understood in the 
context I have sketched (1894). 
The essential links in this argument, between ideology and class conflict, are 
largely presumed on the basis of broad characterizations of a complex 
movement and the occurrence of peaks and valleys of activity in roughly 
appropriate historical periods. The evidence is simply inadequate to sub-
stantiate any particular causal relationship between Supreme Court deci-
sions and the ciyil rights movement. To state the theoretical/methodological 
assumption clearly, once Supreme Court doctrine has been examined and 
categorized, its effects are assumed without further analysis. 
Our second illustration follows a similar pattern. Klare's analysis of the 
interpretation of the Wagner Act by the Supreme Court demonstrates how 
the alienated form of liberal legalism asserted itself to negate the potentially 
radical content of the Wagner Act, helping to end the realist threat of a 
politicized jurisprudence. 
The New Deal solution to the crisis of legalism was to update legal conscious-
ness and to make it more responsive to contemporary social exigencies-that 
is, to give a new life to the liberal legal order-while at the same time 
preserving its contradictions and mystifications (Klare, 1978: 280). 
The explanation of how the Supreme Court accomplished this objective 
through statutory interpretation obviously depends on a background in 
which class struggle made changes in the content of the law necessary and 
which gives meaning to such terms as "alienation," "mystification," and 
"legitimation" which motivate the entire analysis. "Labor law reform in 
the 1930's," Klare concludes, "served as a vehicle for the preservation of 
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liberal capitalism and the alienated social relationships that constitute it" 
(Klare, 1978: 339). Yet, as in Freeman's research, the focus is exclusively on 
doctrinal developments and interpretations, even though the results are 
meaningful, according to the author's own interpretation, only within an 
undeveloped theoretical framework relating legal ideology to class 
struggle. 19 
One cannot expect that work will be emancipated from its alienated character 
without the abolition of the social relations, including legal relations, that 
produce that character. Alienation can only be transcended through a compre-
hensive historical metamorphosis of social and political relationships, a pro-
cess that would profoundly transform the quality of legal arrangements, in-
deed, the very nature and form of law. Conversely, while legal practice 
remains a form of alienation, there can be no fundamental change in the 
character of work for any other aspect of social life (Klare, 1978: 338). 
We do not in any way challenge these assertions. In fact, they lead to the 
kinds of questions which should guide research. Since the correspondence 
between law and alienation among workers is asserted without more exact 
description of its implications for the significance of statutory interpretation 
by the Supreme Court, this analysis implicitly rests on unexamined assump-
tions about the role of legal ideology. In this respect, it is like liberal legal 
research. The assumption Freeman accepts is that the consciousness of those 
subject to the law is in some way a simple reflection of the alienated form of 
the law in capitalist society. 
Underlying all three strands of research is an implicit premise: tracing, or 
mapping, legal decisions will, in and of itself, reveal the ideological role of 
law, as well as its incoherence. The absence of a serious attempt to examine 
the relationship between doctrine and other institutions in society insures 
that this research will fall short of its own goals. Failure to make a creditable 
case for the ideological role of law in its historical context prevents the 
Conference from maintaining that law potentially has any part to play in 
transforming society. More important, the Conference cannot creditably 
rebut assertions made by liberal scholars that law is not class dominated, not 
repressive, and instead is a rationalizing force (whether or not its doctrine is 
troubled by logical inconsistencies). 
Thus this research, by and large, has treated doctrine as if it were auton-
omous. Whether or not members of the Conference actually believe that 
doctrine is independent of historical context, and there is much evidence 
that they do not,20 their intense debate with conventional scholarship has led 
to placing undue reliance on analysis of doctrine as a source of learning 
about the role and meaning of law. To move forward, it is necessary to make 
explicit the relationship between legal doctrine and other events in society. 
As we attempt to show in Part II, such relationships are already implicit in 
each of these strands of research. Indeed, the critique of liberal legalism 
could hardly be progressive, that is, it could not comprehend the problems 
of oppression and alienation, if it did not have implicit standards for the 
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betterment of human life and an implicit understanding of how Jaw is related 
to the rest of society. 
2. Argumentative Use of Theory: Closely related to the autonomy ot doctrine 
reflected in the methods employed in CCLS research, theory is used in the 
process of research in ways which are inappropriate. Theory should be a 
means of deriving questions. Theory describes the elements of the world 
that are relevant for a particular inquiry. By focusing observation, it guides 
the empirical inquiry of the investigator. Instead of guiding inquiry, we have 
found theory used in CCLS research, as in liberal legal research, to justify 
the continued reliance on exegesis of doctrine as a research method without 
seriously challenging or testing the premises of such a method. Too often, 
Marxist theory is cited as if it made basic research on political economy 
unnecessary rather than central, and too often it is cited to explain the 
significance of doctrinal developments which by themselves do not support 
the theory. 
Research in the "totalistic" strand provides examples of these problems. 
The research by Gabel on contrasting ideological structures underlying 
contract law and on reification in legal reasoning is categorical rather than 
descriptive of process. Legal doctrine is categorized and as categorized is 
said to provide evidence of a certain process of consciousness formation. His 
essay on reification claims to describe "the way that 'the Jaw' emerges within 
our alienated culture as a kind of quasi-religious belief-system which simul-
taneously compensates for our feelings of Joss within these alienated groups 
and conceals these feelings from us" (Gabel, 1982a: 264). But beyond 
assertions that legal concepts are appropriated by individuals in ways which 
produce these effects, the essay does not report direct observation of con-
sciousness formation or its effects on groups of persons. Instead, the essay 
examines the words used in legal rules (see pp. 272-273), inferring the 
impact they have on consciousness from the theory alone. The vagueness of 
the process of consciousness formation as described by Gabel, by compari-
son with concrete processes which we have all experienced, is highlighted 
strikingly by his essay on the mass psychology of the Burger court's political 
imagery (Gabel, 1982b ). Here consciousness formation is described as a 
result of a process more like an ad campaign than language or culture 
acquisition. While ad campaigns and culture are certainly related, if con-
sciousness, at the level involved in Gabel's theory, is subject to rapid shifts in 
Supreme Court imagery, then considerable complexity is added to the 
concept of consciousness formation, for consciousness formation now de-
pends on networks of communication and an immediate context of com-
munication in ways not suggested by his earlier essay. In any event, the 
problem lies not in the idea that the significance of Jaw in capitalist society is 
inseparable from the process of consciousness formation, but in the haste 
made to reach a conclusion about the effects of doctrine without equal 
Munger and Seron LEGAL STUDIES V. LEGAL THEORY 271 
attention to the need for an empirical base for theory construction and 
validation (see e.g., Stinchcombe, 1968). 
By contrast, Tushnet's historical research is more engaged in theory 
testing. Hence, he predicts, and explains, incoherence in legal categories 
based on conflicting ideologies held by judges. But, the ideologies them-
selves and their origins are presumed, and the work does not confirm or 
disconfirm the underlying theory of political economy. The work is narrow, 
therefore, focusing only on how doctrine is used in the process of legal de-
cision, leaving open questions about the relationship between doctrine and 
consciousness. More than others holding similar theoretical views, Tushnet 
also examines alternative theories of legal consciousness to show that they 
suggest patterns of doctrinal development not confirmed by the data. 
Causal connections between capitalist social relations and the develop-
ment of legal doctrine are explicitly incorporated into the theory underlying 
the "normative effects" strand of research. But "normative effects" re-
search, like "totalistic" research, has tended to use theory for the purpose of 
bypassing rather than focusing relevant empirical inquiry on these causal 
links. This research has often relied on "ideal typical" constructs as a basis 
for inferring the effects of doctrinal development rather than using theory to 
generate questions for research. Freeman constructs a model of black-white 
relations in which blacks are defined, a priori, as victims and whites as 
victimizers: 
The concept of 'racial discrimination' may be approached from the perspective 
of either its victim or its perpetrator. From the victim's perspective, racial 
discrimination describes those conditions of actual social existence as a mem-
ber of a perpetual underclass. The perspective includes both the objective 
conditions of life ... and the consciousness associated with those objective 
conditions [italics added] ... The perpetrator perspective sees racial discri-
mination not as conditions, but as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the 
victim by the perpetrator (1978: 1052-1053).21 
As presented, Freeman has borrowed categories from research on racism 
from Piven and. Cloward (1971), Fanon (1967), Grier and Cobbs (1968) and 
others (see fn. 14--15: 1053), but in so doing takes this work out of context, 
specifically out of a historical and political context where the relations 
between victim and victimized are in process, where the "consciousness" of 
victims may, for example, not be directly determined by their objective 
conditions or conversely where the conditions of the perpetrators may be 
forced to change regardless of issues of political consciousness. In other 
words, Freeman has constructed a model of racial patterns that "fits" his 
argument and fails to take account, within the elaboration of that perspective 
to guide empirical study, of the possibility of alternative sets of socio-political 
relations: perpetrators are always perpetrators, victims are always 
victimized. 
Similarly, Klare (1978) constructs a model of relations between labor and 
management that is static: the passage of the Wagner Act ushered in a new 
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era of labor-management relations that is organized around collective bar-
gaining. From the vantage point of labor, Klare asserts, this change was a 
mixed blessing: "collective bargaining has become an institutional structure 
not for expressing workers' needs and aspirations but for controlling and 
disciplining the labor force and rationalizing the labor market" (p. 267). 
Though Klare clearly acknowledges a debt to current work by Marxists on 
law and considers questions of method, including the concept of "relative 
autonomy of legal consciousness" (see e.g., fn. 13), he nevertheless relies 
upon a static model to guide his work. There is no consideration of the 
possibility of other outcomes of the relations between labor and manage-
ment. The development of law moves, albeit with a few "reverses," towards 
the interests of management and thereby, ipso facto, circumscribes the 
consciousness, ipcluding the legal consciousness, of organized labor: orga-
nized labor's "consciousness" echoes the constraints imposed by collective 
bargaining. The model presents a position. The cases "fit" the model. 
Therefore, it is asserted, labor has capitulated its "needs and aspirations,'' 
its political consciousness. 
As we demonstrated in an earlier section, liberal legal scholarship often 
borrows theory to support a preconceived position. In much the same way, 
Conference authors also begin by presuming the validity of theory which 
justifies the analysis ot doctrine. 22 Substituting neo-Marxist categories for 
liberal ones does not address the more fundamental limitations of a method 
of research which in practice relies on the presumed significance of the 
exegesis of doctrine. 
3. Audience: Because CCLS research resembles conventional scholarship in its 
doctrinal focus, one is forced to conclude that its audience, too, is the profes-
sional legal community. Even lawyers opposed to the conclusions reached by 
CCLS research will concede (as they are intended to) that the results have 
been reached by acceptable means from acceptable premises. At best, CCLS 
research speaks to other legal scholars to convince them of the errors of their 
arguments about the significance of legal doctrine, but not to convince them of 
the more fundamental error of their methods of drawing such conclusions 
through analysis of doctrine alone. 
There are three serious side-effects of the method of research and its 
consequent narrowing of the audience reached by the Conference. First, 
given the particular critical views of the Conference, the CCLS audience in 
practice may be limited to those who are converts to the CCLS agenda. 
There is evidence that there is wider interest in the particular criticisms of 
more conventional analyses of doctrine made by Conference members. 
Whether this dialogue becomes broader and continues will be one measure 
of success. 
A second more serious side effect of speaking only to a professional 
audience is that even if the Conference intends only to influence other legal 
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workers, its work will be directed to persons who share the same profession-
al ideological blinders. Assumptions about appropriate topics, theories of 
the relationship between legal ideology and practice, and the selection of 
relevant "data" (i.e., exclusive reliance on legal authority) to sup-
port arguments are all the less likely to be carefully examined and 
criticized. 
The third side effect is the low visibility and scant attention paid to 
practitioners by the Conference. Like the treatment of practice in liberal 
research, Conference research focuses on the production of doctrine by 
judges and scholars and relegates practice to a small role in the legal system. 
Instead of recognizing the role of legal practitioners and other legal workers 
in the production of legal ideology and theory (other than doctrine) and in 
mediating the effects of doctrine, legal practice is reduced to an ancillary 
role-the decision to ask a court to make doctrine or not to make doctrine. A 
serious consequence is that important effects of legal practice, such as the 
defense of legal rights at historically specific and important moments or the 
mediation of the effects of doctrine on politically significant groups, are 
ignored in the attempt to demonstrate the unreliability of "rights" in 
abstract doctrinal analysis (Sparer, 1984). The Conference cuts itself 
off from a major source of learning about the significance of doctrine and 
legal system behavior in general. 
The Conference must clarify for whom it is actually writing: Is it simply 
other members of the Conference? Is it the academic legal community? Or, 
is it a wider community concerned to describe, explain, and transform the 
role of law in society? If the Conference's audience is limited to other 
members of the Conference, then what we have to say may not be relevant; 
hence, we take it as a given, at least for the purposes of this piece, that the 
Conference began with the intent of reaching a wider audience committed 
to understanding and transforming the role of law in contemporary 
society. 
D. A Methodological Critique: Failure to Engage in Critical Self-Analysis 
The source of each of these problems is that the Conference has not fully 
freed itself from the traditions of liberal legal scholarship. The function of 
liberal legal scholarship ultimately is to legitimate a system for authority in 
capitalist society. Hence, liberal legal scholarship is not self-critical, or 
"reflexive" (Gouldner, 1970), because the fundamental function of legal 
scholarship cannot be questioned within liberal legal ideology. To be misled 
by the doctrinal focus of liberal legal scholarship is to adopt a method of 
research which (1) hinders fundamental questioning and testing of alterna-
tive conceptualizations about the nature of legal ideology, (2) hinders the 
development of new theory and (3) ignores the need to develop mechanisms 
for self-reflection and self-criticism by the scholar engaged in social study. It 
is not sufficient to reorder, to redocument, or to "map" the irrational, 
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illogical and incoherent foundation of legal developments; to substitute 
irrational for rational, incoherent for coherent, upredictable for predictable 
and call it demystification of law does not a method make! 
Progressive critique, in the dialectical sense, includes a commitment to a 
historically situated analysis of social relations and struggle and, simul-
taneously, an examination of the ideological limits of one's own theory and 
method (see e.g., Horkheimer, 1976). Any method of research inevitably 
creates ideological blinders that must be exposed to criticism and reflection. 
Certainly this is true of social science research methods (Furner, 1975) and, 
it is equally true of legal research. Both are ideological outcomes of profes-
sional activities. Hence, it is not possible to develop a critique of liberal 
legalism without, at the same time, examining the ideology of doctrinal 
analysis and its relationship to the legitimacy of law. A progressive analysis 
of legal ideology entails critique of legal method. This is especially important 
in light of the centrality of a doctrinal method to the legitimacy of liberal 
legalism. Doctrinal method assumes the normative authority of law. Doc-
trinal method makes possible a common language, even as it structures 
authority, between the academician and the practitioner. Thus it is as 
important to develop a critique of this method as it is to develop a critique of 
the structural characteristics of liberal legalism (e.g., rule, formal equality, 
etc.). In fact, a critique of liberal legalism as ideology is not possible without 
a simultaneous examination of the researcher in unravelling that ideology. 
This much should be self-evident: those who currently study the ideology of 
liberal legalism are socialized in a professional setting organized to legiti-
mate liberal legalism; therefore, it is incumbent upon these scholars to 
examine self-critically the ways in which their professional socialization 
structures their vision about these institutions. This step in turn raises 
questions about how one has come to understand; i.e., it raises questions 
about method. 
Yet within CCLS little, if any, attention has been devoted to self-reflec-
tion about the role of the scholar and to critique of legal method. 23 While 
CCLS writers work out their ideas in a self-conscious manner and are aware 
of themselves as persons engaged in study, they are not self-critical in the 
sense that they examine their own ideological position.24 That is, self-
conscious and self-critical or self-reflexive thought are two quite different 
processes: self-conscious thought leading to personal explication of the self 
and self critical thought leading to social explication of the self in relationship 
to the project. Therefore, drawing upon a tradition of self-conscious reflec-
tion, a close reading of CCLS work reveals scant attention to the role of the 
scholar in doing research. CCLS researchers have not taken the step of 
elaborating their own role in demystifying law; they have not questioned 
why they see, or do not see, certain processes in light of their own social 
position or praxis. Nevertheless, this vacuum underscores the entrenched 
power of the stratified, cloistered and specialized system of contemporary 
scholarship, and legal scholarship in particular. 25 
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II. REFORMULATION OF METHOD 
The problem we have elaborated in the first section is one of method. The 
fact that CCLS researchers study doctrine is not itself problematic. Nor are 
any particular hypotheses or theory employed by CCLS members in re-
search the source of the difficulty. Rather, there is a problem with the way 
CCLS members think about and do research. Both the fact that doctrine 
alone is used as data about ideology and the fact that theories are misem-
ployed as descriptions of reality are traceable to methodological errors, as 
we have shown. If the Conference moved in the direction of a self-critical 
method, that is, if its members had a more fully developed view of the 
activity of research, we believe that the laudable objectives of CCLS re-
search would carry it in a productive direction. 
The research method which we describe in this section is dialectical. We 
describe its premises and implications for formulating and testing hypoth-
eses about legal ideology, or, for that matter, any aspect of a social forma-
tion. This method of viewing and exploring the world does not impose new 
goals on CCLS. On the contrary, as social scientists we were drawn to CCLS 
research on legal ideology because of its concern with the role of ideology 
and its professed skepticism of positivism. These themes reflect the influ-
ence of a dialectical method underlying many varieties of Marxist social 
theory. In this sense, we are describing a way of adding to the project begun 
by CCLS. 
The importance of dialectical method had been given meaning through 
the work of the Frankfurt School and its commitment to place this contribu-
tion at the center of Marxist analysis. The members of the School arrived at 
this question through their attempt to come to grips with the problem of 
authority, and particularly, the apparent trend toward an all-encompassing 
rationalization of contemporary society. 26 The forms of oppression in con-
temporary society are reflected in the movement toward orderly social 
processes, predictable outcomes, rules for their own sake and an objectifica-
tion of social relations in all spheres of human endeavor. Put simply, 
alienated human relationships are no longer limited to the "shop floor"; 
rather, bourgeois ideology finds expression in all arenas of human endeavor 
from the most public, politics, to the most private, the family (see e.g., 
Lasch, 1977). The question posed by the Critical School was how does one 
explain, and specify, bourgeois ideology?27 
The Frankfurt School found exploring capitalist society inseparable from 
issues of research methodology. Thus the Frankfurt School opened the 
debate on method (see esp. Adorno, 1976). To this end, they began by 
rejecting positivism, including neo-Marxist positivism (McCarthy, 1982: 
126-272). Instead, they emphasized the development of theory guided by 
praxis, and they engaged in empirical study, though with great debates 
about appropriate techniques (see e.g., Jay; 1973). According to this view, 
the study of social phenomena builds upon theoretical elaboration, a self-
critical scholar, and empirical investigation. 
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At this point we intend to sketch the basic propositions of a self-critical 
method. We do this to demonstrate the centrality of two related ideas that 
evolve from a Marxist tradition-dialectic and contradiction. These con-
structs have clear implications for research. By showing how they follow 
from fundamental theoretical and epistemological premises we demonstrate 
that this research has certain methodological requirements. 
A. A Self-Critical Approach to Research 
Human activities are social activities that exist within a network of interac-
tion among individuals and continue as part of the ongoing existence of a 
society. To be a human being is to be a social being. 28 The actions of any 
particular individual take place within concrete, historical configurations of 
social relations. In the short run, at least, such configurations tend to persist 
as institutions, organizations, and classes-significant entities which shape 
relations among individuals. These configurations are themselves the out-
come of historical activities of individuals whose role, position, power and 
consciousness, i.e., "actualization," is explained in the context of situated 
events. We use the general term group to denote such entities. The relations 
between groups guide social action--consciously and/or unconsciously-
and hence are the most important agents of change and the most important 
source of meaning for a theory of society. 29 Research, then, is the study of 
the formation and transformation of relations between and within social 
groups. For example, Marx's analysis of the formation of a proletariat class 
could not be historically explained separate and apart from the formation of 
a bourgeois class. The relationship between the two classes defines each, 
and at the same time the concrete relationship constitutes the most impor-
tant historical contingency in the lives of individuals. That is, the underlying 
relationship between the classes is the most significant long-run factor in 
determining the conditions, including consciousness, of members of each 
class. The historical contingency of all social life, implying continual tension 
and change through the relational nature of social existence, is what is meant 
by the term dialectical. 
The intellectual's role is a precarious one. The intellectual, too, is a 
product of a group's historical location. The principal question in research is 
thus how one overcomes one's own historical blinders so that the product of 
one's work does not reflect only the limited perspective of group ideology. 
The researcher must be involved in a process of self-criticism, i.e., a process 
of reflection about one's own basic predispositions and assumptions. The 
scholar is not an outsider to social activities. 30 In this regard, the scholar's 
role is analogous to that of a pilot-one who understands wind patterns but is 
never free of wind conditions: the scholar understands social patterns, but is 
never free of social conditions. As Habermas writes,"[ s ]elf-reflection brings 
to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process of cultiva-
tion and spiritual formation which ideologically determine a contemporary 
praxis of action and the conception of the world" (1973: 22). 
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Inevitably, this creates a tension for the scholar. In the process of self-
criticism, the researcher becomes a part of the endeavor itself. If research is 
a process of developing a coherent political framework for understanding 
and changing societies,31 then it must evolve as political activity reorders 
society. Research is thus useful in the political struggles of a particular time 
and location. In sum, the intellectual is engaged in the study of group activity 
of which she is a part, group activity is always in the process of becoming, 
and understanding the relational and contingent nature of group activity 
gives meaning to the endeavor. 
From this starting point, we may derive three methodological principles 
which govern how we must do research: (1) the relational nature of human 
existence means that there is a disjunction or contradiction between human 
activity and the outcome of that activity; (2) contradiction is fundamental to 
social theory and research; and (3) the relational position of the researcher 
and the contradictory nature of research itself means that there will always 
be a tension in research between the activity and its outcome. 
(1) Disjunction between human activities and the outcome of that 
activity: Because groups exist only in relation to other groups, activity 
always affects the social relations comprising the group in which action is 
located. 
Each component of an entity is itself a Relation whose development is a function 
of the particular configuration of circumstances in which it stands. It is the result 
of all these different developments (viewed as occurring within the entity) that 
determines what the entity as a whole will become. "Contradiction" is a way of 
referring to the fact that not all such developments are compatible. In order to 
progress further in the direction made necessary by its own links of mutual 
dependence a component may require that the probable course of change of 
another component be altered. The developments of the two ... stand in con-
tradiction, and it is through the working out of such contradictions that the larger 
entity takes on the form it does. (Oilman, 1976:56-57). 
Thus social action is generically contradictory. For example, in the process 
of formation, a bourgeois class created a political ideology based upon 
liberal, egalitarian, and universal values; however, that ideology played a 
contradictory role in class relations because it inevitably came into conflict 
with bourgeois political interests when it was appropriated as a goal of 
proletarian political aspirations. 
The principle that social action is contradictory has some clear implica-
tions for research. First, if contradiction is a given of social action, then it 
must be taken into account in planning and developing research strategies, 
including the development of hypotheses for analysis of the meaning of 
institutional relations. Hence, we must rethink all of our assumptions about 
a positivist or a doctrinal tradition where it is taken for granted that relations 
may be held constant or static for the purpose of "scientific" analysis, 
or that a relationship between two or more variables (or cases) is unidirect-
ional, or that relations within an institutional context can be analyzed 
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apart from historical and theoretical analysis of that context. Second, 
the activity of research is itself contradictory and must be understood as 
such.32 
(2) Contradiction is fundamental to social theory and research: In positing 
that contradiction is fundamental, we are stating that patterns of daily life 
can be explained as disjunctions between activity and outcome. Some of 
these disjunctions--contradictions-are momentary while others are played 
out over long periods of time, with enduring effects upon the formation and 
transformation of human activities. Thus while all social activities are con-
tradictory, some patterns are more important than others because some are 
more enduring than others. 33 
While social formations may be long enduring, with perhaps all of the 
appearance of permanence, relations are in fact active, in conflict, and 
contain seeds of their own transformation. It is the task of the scholar to sort 
out and specify why, how and for whom social formations exist, why some 
last for only brief periods on the map of history while others endure across 
long sweeps of time, and which have great significance for the future of 
humanity. 
In order to determine the conditions of existence and the relative import-
ance of components within historical formations, the scholar must always 
examine the relations in which components, or groups, stand to one 
another. To take a long-enduring example, capitalism is a socio-economic 
formation that has historically produced groups--classes-whose interests 
and activities can only be explained in a relational and contradictory con-
text: one cannot explain the endurance of this social formation by focusing 
upon the power of dominant groups, or upon the weaknesses of exploited 
groups. Rather, the researcher must examine the relational nature of these 
elements in a historically situated context. 
(3) Research itself is contradictory: If the researcher is comprised in large 
part through her relation to the research project, and the project itself is in 
the process of becoming, then there will always be a tension in research 
between activity and outcome. Whereas a positivist method claims that the 
researcher is unique in that she has the luxury to step outside of the 
formation under study and that she has the power to stop change for the 
purposes of study, a dialectical method claims that the researcher is of 
society and without the power to hold change in check. 
Critical theory is doubly reflective: it is self-conscious of its origins in the 
historical development of society, and it is self-conscious of its role in the 
further development of society. This double reflexivity distinguishes it not 
only from the objectivism of the exact sciences but from the self-sufficiency of 
traditional philosophy (McCarthy, 1982: 135-136). 
At a minimum, then, the results of research are (a) incomplete and (b) 
provisional. 
(a) Research is incomplete and imperfect because, of necessity, some-
thing less than a social totality must be considered. The subject matter of all 
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research, as the researcher herself, exists as a social relation and is, there-
fore, contingent. But no research project can account for all such contingen-
cies. Not only are researcher and subject matter contingent, but the un-
accounted for contingencies cannot be "held constant" because they consti-
tute the researcher and her project. Thus scientific method is imperfect, 
yielding at best an approximation of social relations, not only because 
research produces incomplete information but also because there are no 
wholly external objects in society to be studied. 
(b) In addition, the vocabulary-language-and concepts for doing re-
search are themselves provisional (see esp. Heydebrand, 1977). At an 
abstract level, language is the product of human activities and is therefore 
subject to all of the same possibilities of change and transformation of any 
human activity. At a more concrete level, the research project may modify 
the position of the researcher, the significance of the theory, and the 
meaning of the concepts used to describe the project under study. One 
develops sensitivity to this problem through interaction with the research 
project itself: a dialectical method requires an awareness of the relationship 
between the research project and its institutional moorings (i.e., activities 
not previously illuminated, contradictions not previously seen) so that new 
elements may be taken into account and one may revise the research 
strategy. The researcher must step back from the project in order to estab-
lish new relational bearings on the historical trajectories of key elements of 
change and activity. The world keeps changing; yet, research is possible. 
Research is an e·ndless process of producing knowledge for the moment. If 
research is to aid progressive change, then it too must change-and so must 
the researcher. 
B. Dialectical Method and Research on Legal Ideology 
In this section we show how dialectical method would change CCLS re-
search. We will focus on the need to examine th~ relational nature of legal 
ideology. The reader should note that a dialectical method also informed 
our discussion of CCLS scholarship outlined in part one and in this sense 
provides an example of the direction we suggest; there, we demonstrated that 
the failure of CCLS members to be self-critical results in a failure to take 
account of the relational nature of the researcher and the project under 
study. Once the researcher is aware of the influence of historical or 
situational forces on the way questions for study are posed, it is then possible 
to understand how legal ideology, as a subject matter for research, must be 
considered as itself a component in the continual unfolding of social rela-
tions of which the scholar is a part. 
Before turning to a consideration of how the CCLS agenda might be 
recast and developed it may be useful to recapitulate our argument: 
1.) Doctrinal analysis carries its own ideological baggage tharserves to legiti-
mate liberal legalism. Doctrine cannot by analyzed on its own terms (and is 
280 LAW & POLICY July 1984 
never in fact so analyzed). Documenting, or mapping, the internal incoher-
ence, irrationality, and unpredictability of legal decisions in and of itself does 
not lead to an accurate understanding of legal ideologies. 
2.) Critical analysis requires a reflexive scholar, i.e., a scholar who examines· 
her role as itself the product of a social context. Pressures to accept a specific 
professional paradigm for research or to make assumptions about objects of 
inquiry which arise from the position of the researcher within a particular 
professional group must be examined and scrutinized. Critical research de-
pends upon one's view of the nature of society and requires an understanding 
of potential bias due to the historically situated nature of research. 
3.) Social theory evolves from analysis of the inherently contradictory nature 
of social life and must focus upon the historically situated formation and 
transformation of relations between groups. Thus, a theory of the role of law 
must take account of the group-relational significance of events within the 
legal system. 34 In particular, the full significance of legal doctrine can be 
understood only in terms of the concrete effects which the legal system has on 
social activities, i.e., as the incomplete and momentary outcome of relations 
between groups. 35 
CCLS research, as we demonstrated in Part I.C, repeatedly assumes that 
ideology bears a static relationship to social structure. All strands of CCLS 
social theory assume that an ideology, by its very nature, performs a known 
role in the ordering of social relations without making the role, i.e., the 
relational nature of ideology, an object of study in its own right. 36 
Implicitly, CCLS research acknowledges that theoretical assumptions 
about the relationship between legal doctrine and socio-political context 
must guide the categories in which legal doctrine is described and explained. 
Therefore, in spite of its lack of self-critical content or dialectical under-
standing, it provides a point of departure for extending our understanding of 
the ideological underpinnings of liberal legalism. There is, however, no 
evidence in this work of a fundamental questioning of the scholar's role as 
itself contributing to the legitimation of liberal legalism. That is, the very act 
of doing doctrinal scholarship is an act of legitimation of liberalism, even 
when the tone of that analysis is critical, as indeed it is in the case of CCLS. 
We have pointed to two factors that help account for this pattern: (1) the 
isolation of professional law schools and the premium placed upon a method 
of research that conforms to certain "taken-for-granted" standards and (2) 
the acceptance of a role for scholars which is self-conscious but not self-
critical. 
In sum, one might argue that the work represents a series of exciting but 
unanswered questions. In taking this step, we are attempting to develop ques-
tions that are informed theoretically, draw upon data grounded in historical 
context, demand that the researcher announce and self-critically examine 
her "standpoint," and, finally, develop "knowledge with a use potential" 
(Cain and Finch, 1981: 112). How might these questions be recast?37 
To consider the nihilist strand of research: though Kennedy denies the 
possibility of relating doctrine to external economic or political events, the 
very categories in which his analysis is couched were not selected for their 
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doctrinal significance alone. The categories "rule" and "standard" have no 
real a priori significance, but in fact are interesting to readers because of the 
claims lawyers make about the way "rules" and "standards" relate to the 
legitimacy of their activities. The discussion cries out for a more precise 
conceptualization of the processes which make the form of legal principles 
significant to lawyers, and that requires self-reflection about the role of the 
lawyer. The parallels in moral and political history described by Kennedy do 
not supply such a conceptualization. The history of attempts to recast the 
theory of common law adjudication is just that-history, not a series of 
logical exercises, like a long-term chess game. There are interpretations of 
the timing and sequence of doctrinal evolution to be explored at every turn. 
Whether or not Kennedy discusses the historical (and group-relational) 
significance of the development of common law adjudication, his contribu-
tion is important because of its potential for future study; however, the 
mode of analysis he adopts hinders the formulation of questions that de-
mand a historically situated analysis. Thus the historical relationships impli-
cit in Kennedy's work must be made explicit and central in conceptualizing 
doctrinal change. 
Similarly, Kennedy's analysis of Blackstone's Commentaries is a major 
contribution to the research of the Conference even though his explanations 
of its significance are couched in ahistorical and psychologically reductionist 
terms. The power of the Commentaries derives from the relationship be-
tween contradictory pressures for legal legitimacy and specific historical 
events. It is precisely such historically positioned and contradictory press-
ures on the one hand, and the appeal of the Commentaries to eighteenth-
century lawyers on the other, that made the Commentaries significant. The 
ascendancy of a Whig aristocracy initiated legal evolution described in part 
in E. P. Thompson's Whigs and Hunters (1976). The eighteenth-century 
English ruling class also used legal ritual to achieve social control in eight-
eenth-century England as described by Douglas Hay (1975). These works 
provide a rich context for scholarship relating formalism and contradiction 
in legal practice to historical processes which lend significance to both 
formalism and contradiction. It is doubtful whether Kennedy's readership 
actually believes that logical contradiction in the theory of judicial decision, 
as Kennedy sometimes characterizes the central dilemma of liberal legality, 
matters very much absent strong assumptions about the economic and 
political role oflaw which simultaneously make the contradictions necessary 
and make it necessary to deny that they exist. 
The "totalistic" and "normative· effects" strands of research also begin 
with exciting and important questions. Gabel, Tushnet, Freeman and Klare 
assume that doctrinal change is to be understood in terms of its group-
relational significance. The categories which each of them uses to describe 
changes in legal doctrine are constructed on the basis of a theory of the 
relationship between law and other activity in society. The fact that much of 
this theory remains implicit, and that the social relations which give ideology 
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meaning are not made the object of study greatly weakens the power of the 
research. That these relationships are acknowledged and described, howev-
er vaguely, represents the great potential of the research in each instance. 
Gabel's phenomenological account of legal ideology is based on implicit 
hypotheses about social relations. Gabel argues that legal ideology is an 
example of the dominant world view, containing within it an image of people 
as members of society. Moreover, the image created by legal ideology is 
shared by the persons whose image is projected in the world view on which it 
is based. As such, Gabel concludes, it "passivizes" by making the social 
relations it projects seem inevitable, even ordinary or normal. Subtle forms 
of ideological repression and control exist, and we do not take issue with 
Gabel's hypotheses. But the fact that the links between ideology and action 
are assumed rather than the focus of his analysis is a reflection of the 
problems we have already described. Consciousness and its passivizing 
ideologies are open-ended, fluid entities. The hypotheses concerning the 
social relations underlying legal ideology should be subject matter for in-
quiry. Tushnet is quite explicit about the political economy upon which he 
predicates his phenomonological account of the law of slavery (see Section 
I.C, l.b above). But unless the social relations conditioning that political 
economy are drawn into the research on ideology, the contradictory, dialec-
tical development of that ideology is lost. The internal tensions within legal 
ideology and the attempts to accommodate both capitalist (free market) and 
paternalistic (slave-holding) principles are an important focus of study be-
cause they can tell us how legal ideology helps constitute social relations. 
Tushnet is certainly not oblivious of this significance. Absent an inquiry 
which looks specifically at ideology as relational, we are left with a base-
superstructure model of the production of doctrine which greatly oversim-
plifies the way in which legal ideology actually becomes constitutive of social 
relations in historical contexts. 
To recast Freeman's analysis requires the exploration of doctrinal change 
from a properly group-relational perspective. The question for research 
becomes: To what extent are changes within a politically significant move-
ment related to major shifts in Supreme Court doctrine? And, simul-
taneously, what happens to the lawyer advocate in the process? Stated in this 
way, there i~ no assumption about the repressive effects of Supreme Court 
decisions on the civil rights movement; the requisite evidence to answer this 
question demands far more than that contained in published decisions of the 
Supreme Court. Rather, the relationship between Supreme Court decisions 
and a popular movement becomes an object of inquiry, i.e., problematic: 
how does litigation, a social activity, stand in a concrete relationship to a 
social movement? The manner in which particular theories of civil rights 
violations are presented to a court by participants in the movements or by 
lawyers who act on behalf of one or more participants in the movement 
should itself be an object for study and must be e?Cplored, given Freeman's 
original question and concern. More specifically, the question demands 
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examination of the process of litigation and the strategies adopted. For 
example, to what extent were legal arguments at the trial level presented 
from the vantage point of the "victim" thereby demanding consideration of 
a social definition of the violation and of the remedy, and in conformity with 
the political consciousness of the movement, knowing full well that this 
strategy might prove precarious? In turn, the Supreme Court's decision may 
be a product of these intervening factors. More significantly, the question as 
posed here demands consideration of the possibility that Supreme Court 
decisions may have contradictory effects. After all, leaders of political 
movements are used to living with the whims of a court system that hands 
down such contradictory decisions and may manipulate them to their advan-
tage. Hence, one is also forced to examine what a hostile reaction from the 
courts means to the strength of a movement and its political consciousness. 
Before any plausible theory can be put forward, the civil rights movement 
must be acknowledged as a process of on-going change in its own right and a 
general theory must be proposed so that one may relate measurable charac-
teristics of movements to the doctrinal change described by Freeman. 
Without a test of some hypothesis linking doctrine and movements, little is 
learned about the significance of changes in doctrine for the political con-
sciousness of the movement itself, even though a major purpose of the 
research was to describe precisely this significance. 38 
Klare's study of Supreme Court interpretations of the Wagner Act is 
subject to similar problems. Both the class origin of common law contract 
doctrine and the repressive effect of such doctrine are assumed rather than 
explored. Again, the significance of legal doctrine cannot be assumed in 
view of the changing and potentially contradictory group-relational signifi-
cance of law itself. The core of Klare's analysis shows the tendency of formal 
analysis to capture and assimilate doctrinal change to existing doctrine. The 
analysis carried out in these terms alone cannot be faulted, but without more 
it has no significance for the stated interests Klare himself puts forward, viz. 
the relationship between the political consciousness of the labor movement 
and changes in legal doctrine. Clearly, the significance of the research is the 
implication that formality springs from and favors certain class interests. 
Unable to treat all aspects of the relationship between class conflict and law 
in a single article, it might be said that Klare simply explores one aspect of 
the relationship, a point he makes in subsequent work (1982). However, 
since a major object of the research was clearly to confirm the class nature of 
the law, and thus its alienating and repressive qualities, those very effects 
should not be assumed, but related to the particular analysis performed in 
the research. The essay fails to do this. 39 Analysis of doctrine on its own 
terms, even with the best of intentions, is never sufficient if one's concern is 
to explain legal ideology as a social relation. 40 
Each of these examples represents an important contribution to the work 
of the Conference. The most valuable aspect of each contribution is its 
potential for stimulating insights into the role played by law in society. Each 
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piece relies upon assumed relationships between doctrinal evolution and 
socio-political context. In research within the "normative effects" and 
"totalistic" strands, these relationships are explicit. However, they are not 
developed to a point of conceptual clarity, and they remain untested. In 
research within the "nihilist" strand, the relationships are only implicit. In 
all three cases, it is necessary to move beyond a focus on doctrine alone; 
doctrine cannot be treated as an isolated variable: researchers must be 
aware of and resist the biases of professional training and the pressures of 
other legal scholars to treat doctrine on its own terms. To carry this agenda 
forward, research must reflect explicitly the group-relationship significance 
of an historically situated legal system. The relationships between the legal 
system and other events in society give doctrine its significance. Therefore, 
any research which explores the significance of doctrine must make these 
relationships an object of inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
If human activity is social activity and the outcome of this activity is always in 
the process of becoming, then the interests and relations of some groups 
echo the past, others envelop the present, while still others resonate with the 
possibilities for the future: group activities generate different, partial and 
unequal points of historical view. Yet, if a theory of society gains its mean-
ing, its richness, by explaining social relations, then some points of view-
albeit partial and unequal-are nevertheless better than others. To quote 
Lucien Goldmann, 
Viewed in terms of their effect on scientific thought different perspectives and 
ideologies do not exist on the same plane. Some value-judgements permit a 
better understanding of reality than others. When it is a question of determin-
ing which of two conflicting sociologies has the greater scientific value, the first 
step is to ask which of them permits the understanding of the other as a social 
and human phenomenon, reveals its infrastructure and clarifies, by means of an 
immanent critical principal, its inconsistencies and its limitations (Goldmann, 
1969: 52; emphasis in original). 
In this essay, we presented the problems that the researchers within the 
Critical Legal Studies movement face in developing a useful description of 
legal institutions that will provide a framework for both critique and recon-
struction. Our point is not that the goals of the Conference have outrun 
actual achievements. This is true of any serious movement for social change. 
Our point is that the goals and actual methods of achieving them are at odds, 
reducing the chances for success. We demonstrated that the critique of legal 
doctrine by the Conference has had the effect of reinforcing the centrality of 
doctrine and the role of the legal professional as uniquely qualified interpre-
ter of law. The Conf~rence has created a mystique of demystification. 
Further, the anti positivism of the movement's underlying Marxism has 
given way to a suspicion of empirical research relating law to social context. 
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Analysis of legal thought has been transformed into exegesis of legal texts 
rather than a search for new, relevant data to inject into sterile doctrinal 
debates. And finally, the goal of transforming society has stalled in debates 
with other schools of doctrinal interpretation. Despite these problems, the 
work of this movement suggests a useful beginning. Thus, our critique of 
CCLS has not been merely an intellectual exercise; rather, we hope that we 
have articulated a basis for moving socio-legal scholarship toward a more 
effective research program with a commitment to explanation and progres-
sive social change. 
*This is a revised paper prepared for a panel at the 1983 Annual Meeting of 
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies held at Camden, New Jersey. 
When a call for suggestions for the Conference went out, we proposed a 
panel that addressed ,methods for studying legal ideology, with -specific 
consideration of the need to examine self-critically the inherent biases of 
normative legal and social science methodologies. This paper began, then, 
as a discussion piece. As the paper, and the panel, evolved the topics 
addressed included (1) an examination of the limitations of traditional legal 
scholarship and its relationship· to legal education, (2) a description of the 
parallels between CCLS scholarship and more traditional scholarship, 
and (3) an outline of a self-critical methodology. We would like to thank the 
members of this panel, David Trubek and Mark Tushnet, for joining us in a 
discussion of this important issue. 
Along the way, there were many who provided intellectual and moral 
support, discussed ideas with us, and provided comments on various drafts. 
Our thanks to Rick Abel, John Brigham, Maureen Cain, Bliss Cartwright, 
Robert Gordon, David Greenberg, Joel Handler, Christine Harrington, 
Wolf Heydebrand, Wythe Holt, Felice Levine, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Martha Minow, Judy Munger, David Trubek, and Barbara Yngvesson. 
And, our deepest appreciation to Vivian Rodgers who cleaned up more 
revised drafts than we are sure she cares to recall. There are no doubt many 
questions that remain to be explored, perhaps because we did not accept all 
of the suggestions of our generous colleagues. These problems are our 
responsibility. Nevertheless, we hold out the hope that we stimulated others 
to engage in a collective effort to improve upon our understanding of the 
contradictory forces of liberal legalism and to use that understanding to 
create a more just society. 
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NOTES 
1. Karl Klare provides a definition of liberal legalism: 
"With respect to the modern Anglo-American form, [liberal legalism] include[s] 
adherence to precedent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and the 
judicial (retrospective) functions, the obligation to formulate legal rules on a 
general basis (the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to complex procedural 
formalities, and the search for specialJzed methods of analysis (legal reason-
ing). All of these institutions are designed to serve the fundamental desider-
atum of separating morals, politics, and personal bias from adjudication .... 
"Not surprisingly, the crisis of liberal capitalism revealed itself within law as a 
breakdown of the separation between law and politics and between law and 
private interests, as a tendency for law and politics to merge or for law to become 
politicized" (1978: 276-277). 
2. Ironically, the notion of a liberal arts education has itself become a "specialty" of 
certain kinds of colleges, or schools within universities; what was assumed to be 
an educational foundation for an emerging male elite in the late nineteenth 
century, has today become one specialty within a larger division of educational 
options. 
3. It is interesting to note that this is one facet of legal training that closely "fits" the 
ideology of an adversarial model of dispute resolution and is in turn one facet of 
the ideology of liberal legalism. 
4. In a recent, and very moving, eulogy to Arthur Leff, Owen Fiss (1981) captured 
the essence of this tradition; Leff was known to have taught an unusually wide 
variety of courses. At one point, Fiss learned that Leff, ever a good Yale Law 
School citizen, had gone to the dean to find out what courses needed to be taught 
so that the school could continue to claim its name as a law school. 
5. See Pipkin, 1976: 1173-1176. Pipkin's point is well taken. He found that students 
at national law schools were more skeptical about the value of legal pedagogy to 
their experience than students at regional schools (p. 1176). 
6. See Tushnet (198lb) on legal education who claims, with justification, that there 
is a "break in the stratification system" between the schools at the "top" 
(Harvard, Yale, Chicago, and Stanford) and the next rung (e.g., New York 
University, Michigan, Duke, Columbia). Tushnet goes on to suggest that "[t]hat 
judgement could be confirmed by an·examination of the circulation of faculty 
members, which I suspect would show that faculty members circulate within 
each stratum" (p. 1207). 
7. In an intellectual history of the study of legal history, Gordon, citing Abel's work 
on law books, points out that one of the reasons that legal history remained 
"inside the box," i.e., constrained by the methods of legal reasoning, was that it 
was itself a " 'form of professional activity within the legal system-like ad-
judication, or advocacy, or counseling' " (1975: 20) and like those activities 
became a process of filling in the "legal details" (p. 26). 
8. Elite law schools produce/supply law faculties. Within these schools there is, of 
course, yet another pecking order that defines a small, and closed, hierarchy 
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(see n.6). For our purposes, however, it is interesting to note that the elite 
schools, that form the focal point of this discussion, probably play their most 
influential role in establishing the form that legal scholarship takes. 
9. One legal scholar, in a moment of candor, has described his research, and 
reading in an area of the social sciences, as being akin to "briefing" a case, i.e., 
he reads for the facts that support his position. 
10. Legal realism is in part to be understood as one response to the socio-political 
currents that came of age during the Progressive Era. Many historians have 
begun to trace the threads of this "watershed" (see esp. Commager, 1950; 
Hofstadter, 1955; Wiebe, 1967). By the turn of the century, American capitalism 
had come of age. In response, state and federal regulations were first intro-
duced, giving rise to administrative agencies (Lowi, 1969). Municipal reforms 
were developed (Weinstein, 1968). Higher education took on new importance 
(Veysey, 1965) as did professionalism and professional expertise (Bledstein, 
1976) Hofstadter, 1955; Larson, 1977). 
This "watershed" also had its effect upon the law: a crisis emerged in the 
viability of formalism as a sufficient and self-contained legitimating premise. 
Moreover, new, and "scientific," solutions to social conflicts emerged. The 
strands of this intellectual transformation emerged by the late nineteenth cen-
tury as descendents of Dewey's generation insisted that society is an interdepen-
dent process in which the parts are connected and mutually dependent. A world 
which is seen to be "interdependent" posed a direct threat to the most basic 
assumption of legal formalism, i.e., individualism, and, at the same time, had 
significant consequences for the development of intellectual communities. Thus 
the social sciences, and especially economics, suggest the possibility that (1) 
human affairs are open to scientific study; (2) it is possible to develop a "quasi-
paradigm" for research; and (3) there is "a market for expert advice" that may 
"discredit traditional systems of belief" (Haskell, 1977: 43). Most specifically, 
this quasi-paradigm discredited the notion that law is a self-contained and 
sufficient perspective for writing social policy. Thus a direct threat to the 
assumptions underlying formalism came, in part, from the emergence of the 
social sciences at the turn of the century. In response to a historically new set of 
social problems the social sciences, especially economics, presented a strategy 
for "solving" conflicts that seemed reasonable because they rested upon scien-
tific, i.e., objective, standards. In so doing, this young science challenged the 
autonomy and control of earlier notions of legalism, especially formalism, as 
well as the control of the legal profession. 
Yet, the legal profession did not sit by and passively watch its demise; rather, it 
developed new, and powerful, strategies for reasserting control in twentieth-
century guise. (See Larson [1977) for the history of this development.) In part, 
the reassertion of control entailed the development of a "scientific" approach to 
legal education; here, the course of history at Harvard, and particularly the role 
of Langdell, was pivotal. Equally important, if somewhat later, the emergence 
of legal realism, and particularly the law's first waltz with empirical research, 
sought to merge scientism with the law. As Schlegel (1980) has documented, the 
most vibrant center of this development was at Yale, where Hutchins presented 
a fertile haven for exploring the possibilities of merging legal analysis with 
empirical research and thereby took the formalists head on. Thus the realists 
were willing to begin by asserting that the law is not objective, timeless, and 
universal. Rather, it is subjective, influenced by historical events and the pro-
duct of specific economic, political and social currents. Having taken this leap, 
they confronted a fundamental dilemma: how can the law be legitimate if it is 
acknowledged to be political? It is at this conjuncture that they deferred to the 
trappings of scientific legitimation. By deferring to science and the inescapable 
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"discovery" that the world is an interdependent and social reality, the realists 
pulled the rug out from under legalism, i.e., its most fundamental assumptions 
had no meaning. In its most extreme form, and apparently echoing current 
developments in Critical Legal Studies-if from a different starting point-one 
strand of legal realism gave way to a form of "legal nihilism": general principles 
of law, precedents, and relevant constitutional texts no longer had any meaning; 
all that remained was the hollow base of the law's "essentially irrational" 
foundation (Yudof, 1978: 65-66). Other realists tackled the subtle and complex 
question of trying to synthesize the "discovery" of society, and all that flows 
from that discovery, with the values of liberal legalism. Just as the discovery of 
society took on various political casts, from more radical to mainstream inter-
pretations, so the attempt to synthesize took on various political hues. Again, 
these events foreshadow contemporary developments in Critical Legal Studies: 
the "normative effects" strand, as we described it, seeks to "demystify" the 
LAW by demonstrating its political role and, in the process, implicitly holds out 
the hope of contributing to the development of a more humane society. 
Finally, the realists and Critical Legal Studies share a common pitfall: both 
movements have skirted the question of examining the underlying assumptions 
of legal reasoning and methodology and its centrality to liberal legalism. It is in 
this sense that both movements fall short of being radical, or providing an 
alternative framework for understanding, and changing, society. 
11. In making this point, we are perfectly aware of the fact that social scientists suffer 
the same night vision. Our intent here will not be to state that one form of 
traditional research (i.e., the "scientism" of most social science or the argu-
mentation of most legal research) is better tha:n another. Rather, as we will 
attempt to show, we are committed to a dialectical method which means a 
commitment to a research strategy that supersedes both scientism and predeter-
mined argumentation. 
12. For an overview of this work, see David Kairys (ed.) The Politics of Law (1982). 
13. It must be noted that not all would accept this characterization, specifically the 
point concerning the ideological role of law in a capitalist society. As we shall 
show in the next section, there is an acknowledged commitment among some to 
document or map the irrationality of law and, with it, ~he reification of legal 
consciousness, separate and apart from socio-historical context. Nevertheless, it 
is reasonable to suggest that all would agree that those identified with CCLS 
share a "common disenchantment with liberal legalism" (Gordon, as quoted in 
Levinson, 1983: 1466). 
14. Dalton (1983) describes the "nihilist" strand of research as "irrationalist," 
arguing that the goal is to expose "the contradiction at the heart of the liberal 
order, to pry open the rule structures : .. and argues that the constraints they 
impose on resolution of disputes they purport to govern are imaginary" (p. 235). 
Having taken this position, there remains a political agenda, if an uneasy one, of 
social transformation that, inevitably, must make some accommmodation to 
more reformist positions (also see Trubek, 1984). 
We prefer the term nihilist because it provides an anchor point for considering 
this movement in a larger social context and places the political question center 
stage; if all symbols (though in this case only legal rules, doctrine and decisions 
are considered) are mystifications, how can one act? How does one begin to 
formulate the question for political action? Since social transformation is a 
central concern of the CLS agenda, the question is appropriate (also see Harvard 
Law Review 1982: 1682). 
See Levinson's (1983) review of The Politics of Law and his characterization of 
one strain, particularly Kennedy's work, as a "nihilistic response to the attempt 
to assign to law any discernible content independent of the moral and political 
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desires of those who purport to make decisions in the name of the law" (p. 1470). 
While we agree with Levinson's description of this issue, there are others with 
which we would take issue. 
15. In a recent article Yudof makes a similar point about the earlier realists: He 
suggests that in some forms values can be carried "to the point of legal nihilism. 
For them there are no general principles; ... Law is essentially irrational" 
(1978: 65-66). Thus it is interesting to note that an important theme to emerge 
from the work of the Conference has its origins in a convergence of socio-
political events that date from the turn of the century. 
16. The vacuum, even the impropriety of criticism of doctrine without the aid of a 
social theory explaining the relevance of the critical enterprise itself, seems 
implicitly recognized in Kennedy's own work. At the conclusion of another work 
on the internal structure of doctrine he qualified his findings in the following 
way: "Even this conclusion applies only so long as it is possible to abstract from 
the context of compromises within the mixed economy and the bureaucratic 
welfare state. In practice, the choice between rules and standards is often 
instrumental to the pursuit of substantive objectives. We cannot assess the moral 
or economic or political significance of standards in a real administration of 
justice independently of our assessment of the substantive structure within 
which they operate" (Kennedy, 1976: 1776). 
17. As Tushnet acknowledges, "The exchange of labor power for a wage is the basic 
transaction of bourgeois society, in the sense that it defines that society. In order 
for a market in labour power to operate, each worker's contributions to the 
market must be homogenized; a common unit of measurement is used to reduce 
the varying forms and quality of individual labor to an undifferentiated mass of 
fungible labor power. Thus, in the defining relations of capitalist production, 
each worker's individuality is eliminated in favor of an incomplete version of his 
or her ability. The first characteristic of bourgeois social relations that people 
must interpret is thus the role of partial relationships among people" (1981a: 
32). 
18. In some instances, the work seems to suggest that society is a self-maintaining 
"system" seeking equilibrium. There is a certain irony in this: traditional notions 
of liberal legalism assume evolutionary progress. In the attempt to reveal the 
fallacy of this position, by showing that the law does not really, or always, 
represent the interests it ostensibly sets out to serve, the work often falls into a 
trap of presenting society as a static entity, a world without change, a world 
without changed visions or consciousness through struggle. 
19. Here Trubek (1984) draws a similar conclusion. He writes, "To demonstrate the 
existence of labor law ideology, Klare concentrates exclusively on appellate 
court opinions and academic commentary .... Because Klare assumes that the 
justificatory messages in this elite literature have a direct influence on worker 
and union decision making, he is able to assert that there is a relationship 
between the creation of a labor law ideology and the relative passivity of 
American unions in the post-war period". As Trubek goes on to point out, Kiare 
is not able to "explain why workers or union officials might accept labor law's 
justificatory rhetoric" (p. 46). 
Trubek also raises similar problems or concerns with Kennedy's work. While 
we would agree with Trubek that Klare's work evidences an awareness of and a 
sensitivity to the problem outlined above, there is little evidence in Kennedy's 
work that the issue is of concern to him. We would suggest that this difference in 
the concerns of Klare and Kennedy may be traced to the starting points or 
underlying premises of each scholar as outlined herein. 
20. See for example, Tushnet's astute summary: 
"Social theory in the twentieth century has revolved around efforts to resolve 
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what have been conceived of as epistomological problems of social knowledge. 
The problems arise as claims to objective knowledge are confronted with the 
reality that knowledge is produced by individuals located inextricably within the 
arena about which they are said to have knowledge. Marxism, by insisting that 
all knowledge is a social product and thus that knowledge can have no transcen-
dent validity, generates the central position to which all theories of knowledge 
respond" (1981b: 1220). 
Or, as Gabel has written: 
"Legal theory must avoid producing fiction by transforming its phenomena into 
facts: that is, its method must incorporate a critical phenomenology .... It must 
begin by describing the field of necessity within which consciousness is con-
ditioned in order to disclose the dialectical unity of the inert force of worked 
matter on the one hand with the transcendent intention of the legal idea on the 
other. A whole grasp of the legal moment cannot be forged from a mechanical 
materialism that speaks of the law as merely a 'form' 'reflecting' the rigors of 
necessity, nor from an intuitive apprehension sitting smugly outside of history, 
ignoring the weight of its structured direction" (1977: 602-603). Note, however, 
that there is no mention of the role of the scholar in shaping this description; that 
is, there is no discussion of how the scholar must prepare for the task. We will 
return to this problem in a later section of this paper. 
21. As was shown earlier, Freeman then demonstrates how Supreme Court deci-
sions in the area of civil rights "fit," ultimately, into a view of the world as 
defined by "perpetrators." 
22. We assume that theory has not been misappropriated. (See Priest, 1981). Even 
when not misused, legal scholarship treats as conclusive of issues theory which 
should only be used to raise questions and to formulate hypotheses for testing. 
23. Discussing the concept of legitimation, we would agree with Trubek when he 
writes "despite the appropriation of the label 'critical' the Americans (as com-
pared to the Germans] have paid scant attention to the Frankfurt tradition or to 
the work of its contemporary interpreters like Habermas" (1984: 30). On the 
other hand, Trubek does not discuss the self-critical emphasis of the Frankfurt 
tradition in developing a method for studying the legitimation of ideologies and 
in so doing glosses over a basis for clarifying the limitations of "social trans-
formation" as understood by the Critical Legal Studies movement. 
As Trubek describes it, for CCLS, "If society is in some sense constituted by 
the world views that give meaning to social interaction, then to change con-
sciousness is to change society itself. That is the central tenet of the critical legal 
studies creed, the grounding for the belief that scholarship is politics" (p. 22). 
Or, as Trubek describes it at a later point in his article, "For the contradictions 
[of liberal legalism] can be uncovered, the 'incoherences' demonstrated, the 
denied material brought to light. And if that occurs, then the society can be 
transformed" (p. 42-43). Here we would disagree; see pp 277-279 for a discus-
sion of the problems of this position. 
24. See, for example, the work of Althusser and Balibar (1970), Wright (1978), or 
Poulantzas (1973), all of which evidence a self-conscious perspective, but are not 
self-critical in the way we are using the term here. In fact, Althusser, in dif-
ferentiating himself from Lukacs, challenges this position. 
There are many descriptions of the institutionalized practices which reinforce 
liberal legalism, from discussions of legal advocacy (Simon, 1978) to case 
method (Klare, 1979a), student-teacher relations (Kennedy, 1982) and Iawyer-
client contacts (Gabel and Harris, 1982-83). In each, remedies are assumed to 
flow from a description of the oppressive practices and an alternative vision of,· 
for example, lawyer-client or teacher-student relations. What this leaves out of 
the account is a self-critical examination of the categories in which the analysis 
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takes place (for example "lawyer" and "client") and the assumptions about the 
autonomy and efficacy of choices exercised by a "liberated" scholar or practi-
tioner. To reach these problems one must begin'from a self-critical position, not 
merely from a position of critic. 
25. Given this lack of self-reflection, it is not surprising that much of CCLS research 
comes across as the received word with little consideration of the limitations of 
that "word" or how an angle of vision shapes presentation and often limits full 
understanding. Here, it is interesting to note that CCLS was organized, primari-
ly, by a group of white, male academics with elite legal training: To the extent 
that self-reflection more naturally, though not necessarily or exclusively, flows 
from the bottom up and that the impetus for self-reflective research more 
naturally, though again not necessarily, flows from a need to understand, we can 
begin to piece together why so much of CCLS research has skirted any consid-
eration of the role of the researcher as a part of study itself. 
26. Eloquent testimony to this problem is contained in the work of Weber and his 
concern to understand the forms of rational authority and bureaucracy and its 
relationship to modernization. However, the scholars of the Frankfurt School 
clearly rejected Weberian methods, specifically his concern to develop a value-
free social science; they rejected this method because of its positivist preten-
sions. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to suggest that much of the work of 
the Frankfurt school is, implicitly, a response to the Weberian challenge. The 
similarity of topics selected for study is striking: the rationalization of music and 
literature, politics, and culture. However, they approached this challenge from a 
different methodological starting point and built upon a self-critical method. 
Members of the Frankfurt School have, for the most part, remained squarely 
committed to the central role of class conflict in any understanding of contem-
porary society. In examining the work of critical legal studies, it is these aspects 
of critical theory that are clearly not apparent: (1) attention to the concept of 
class and (2) attention to questions of appropriate methodology for the problem 
under study. And, if concepts of class and method are dropped, Marxist theory 
offers little more than a skepticism of capitalism. 
27. We would suggest that this same cluster of problems has confronted the analysis 
of social class. On the one hand there has been an almost intuitive sense that 
Marx's analysis of social class in its broadest contours is appropriate, but on the 
other hand, that it suffers from being over general and failing to explain the 
formation of new fragments of class (e.g., a managerial class) and the persistence 
of old fragments (e.g., a petty bourgeoisie). Yet, this work has, of late, made 
enormous strides as scholars have attempted to look at the formation of classes 
organized around socio-economic activities, e.g., management (Braverman, 
1974; Noble, 1977), professional work (Larson, 1977), government (O'Connor, 
1973), as against one, all encompassing activity, i.e., capitalism. This strategy 
then provides a unique model for exploring the equally overwhelming construct 
of ideology and suggests that it is possible to do research that refines the "big" 
picture but, at the same time, respects the specificity of changing historical 
circumstances. As the shortcomings of examining ideology as psychology have 
become more and more apparent, there has been a renewed interest in the work 
of the Frankfurt School and the research strategies put forward by this tradition. 
In part this tension may be seen in the recent debates between structuralists 
(Althusser) and radical historians (Thompson) over the meaning of the rule of 
law. The structuralists take the position that the development of categories, 
separate and apart from historical analysis, is at the very least a necessary first 
step; radical historians, on the other hand, reject this argument and set out to 
concretely demonstrate the historical unfolding of this contradictory cluster and 
the forms it takes under different historical circumstances. As O'Malley (1982) 
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has recently shown, the historians are able to take .us a lot further precisely 
because they pay close attention to, and respect the significance of, the historical 
context. Thus they are able to show the circumstances under which legal 
formalism has appeal to dominant class interests. 
28. Gabel has put this quite nicely. Paraphrasing Sartre·, he writes "before I can be 
conscious of myself as a person in the ordinary sense, I must have had the 
experience of being recognized as such by someone else. Therefore to recognize 
myself as myself is to be already a social being" (1977: 630). 
It therefore follows that "the search for an 'essential' identity which is non-
social is a search for something non-human, for an identity not conceived or 
reflected upon in language" (Cain and Finch, 1981: 111). 
29. Of course, under some historical configurations class is one appropriate location 
for studying social relations. Class is, however, only one, among many, types of 
group activities. It should, of course, be noted that there are schools that take a 
different position. For example, there are those who only point to Marx's 
analysis of capitalist society and conclude that class relations determine social 
relations (i.e., the base-superstructure debate); it is this line of argument that 
liberal theorists usually point to as a basis for rejecting, quite appropriately we 
think, Marxist theory. From our point of view, this is, however, a misunder-
standing of Marx. Marx's great contribution to social inquiry was his develop-
ment of a historically informed method for explaining social relations as dialec-
tical processes, i.e., as processes in the process of becoming. For an excellent 
clarification of this point, see Lukacs, 1971. 
30. Describing critical theory, McCarthy writes "From this perspective, critical 
theory can be seen to belong essentially to the self-formative process on which it 
reflects. Extending in methodical form the practical self-understanding of social 
groups, it seeks to raise their self-consciousness to the point where it 'has 
attained the level of critique and freed itself from all ideological delusion.' In 
unmasking the institutionally anchored distortions of communication that pre-
vent the organization of human relations on the basis of unconstrained intersub-
jectivity, the subject of critical theory does not take up a contemplative or 
scientistic stance above the historical process of human development. Knowing 
himself to be involved in this development, to be a result of the 'history of 
consciousness in its manifestations' on which he reflects, he must direct the 
critique of ideology at himself. In this way critical theory pursues self-reflection 
out of an interest in self-emancipation" (1982: 88). 
31. It was this issue that gave the Frankfurt School its greatest challenge (both 
because of the historical period during which these intellectuals worked and 
because of the great effort they expended to overcome a scholarly tradition that 
eschewed debate on the political role of the scholar as scholar) and provided the 
basis for wide debate, i.e., what is the appropriate role for a reflexive scholar? 
How does he or she overcome the tension of description. explanation and 
participation? While a complete answer to these questions warrants its own 
investigation (see e.g., Jay, 1973) on two points these intellectuals agreed: (1) 
scholarship is a political activity; this means that one's work is influenced by 
values that must be clearly articulated, questioned and open to modification and 
change and (2) any form of scholarship that begins with a predetermined 
conclusion is suspect; this means that a scholar must be willing to accurately and 
fairly describe and explain the data. It is for these reasons that critical theory 
rejected, on the one hand, empiricism for its own sake and, on the other hand, 
determinist theories of history: whereas scientism espouses value neutrality, 
determinist theories of society begin with a predetermined conclusion (e.g., the 
inevitability of a proletarian revolution). 
32. We realize that there is a long tradition in the social sciences that takes the 
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position that "value-neutral" scientific research is possible. That is not the 
position that we take here; a full understanding of the scientific method, as used 
in good social science, is much more complex and subtle than the simple belief 
that it is possible to determine "objective" truth. Of course, many who tend to 
oversimplify the meaning of the scientific method reject it out of hand for 
precisely this reason. 
33. In making these points, it should be emphasized that what we have said thus far 
is presented as the basic building blocks of society and that there is nothing that is 
assumed to be inherently determined or directed about the nature of human 
activities beyond this basic point. 
34. Because of their relational nature, events in the legal system produce contradic-
tory effects which in turn produce change. This means that the relationship 
between the legal system and other economic or political events in society can 
never be described in simple functional or instrumental terms. 
35. If the full relational significance of law is appreciated, the results of research 
should be useful to progressive lawyers. i.e., a full understanding of the conting-
encies in social relations makes radical legal practice possible. 
36. Trubek calls the implicit theory linking ideology to social life "the simple 
transmission belt model" (1984: 49). 
37. At this point, it may be useful to respond to an argument against our position 
outlined by Trubek. We argue that, to use his phrase, the "burden of proof" 
remains with CCLS to provide "evidence that legal consciousness does affect 
what goes on in society" (1984: 48). We would assert, his description ofour work 
to the contrary notwithstanding, that doctrine may provide one appropriate data 
source, but we would question whether it is ever sufficient if the task is to 
develop a historically-situated critique of legal ideology. It is possible to read 
Trubek's own criticism of CCLS as conceding our point, although without 
sufficient development. Trubek acknowledges that "reading ideologies by 
analyses of texts" must be enriched "to encompass studies of the construction of 
meaning and its relationship to action at all levels" (p. 48). 
Trubek cites as a promising lead in this direction the work on law schools by 
members of CCLS, particularly that of Kennedy. While some of Kennedy's 
points are insightful they remain problematic. Given the fact that the academic 
contingent within CCLS is the most active, these descriptions of law school 
education are not a surprising development, and they are, of course, a necessary 
one. CCLS should be in the business of questioning the limitations of law school 
education, but that questioning should go beyond "trashing," to use Alan 
Freeman's description. While it is "fun," a central question is absent: What role 
does one play as a law teacher in legitimating liberal legalism, even as one 
debunks or demystifies its supposed coherence and logic? To return to our 
earlier point, Kennedy's writing on the law school is self-conscious in the sense 
that there is the ever-present quality of him as a law professor, but it is hardly 
self-critical in that he does not question his own role in perpetuating another 
mystification, i.e., the taken-for-granted assumption that there is one right 
answer to the question and that the law teacher possesses that information. 
Here, one should not be misled: just because the "right" answer is that the 
substance of legal education is a mystification does not mean that the form and 
process of question and answer has been examined by Kennedy. 
In sum, a major difference between our position and Trubek's is our belief 
that the development of a reflexive scholarship is central to the development of a 
critical theory of law. While Trubek shows that CCLS has not dealt directly with 
the theoretical and methodological issues central to the Frankfurt tradition (see 
n. 23), he does not consider the methodological requirement of self-criticism. 
We take this methodological constraint to be pivotal. For Trubek, however, it is 
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not, or it does not appear to be. Therefore, he is less troubled by some of the 
problems with CCLS research that are exposed by both of us (see e.g., n.19). 
38. What we suggest here is similar to Tushnet's argument regarding Horwitz's 
description of the development of American private law in response to the rise of 
commercial enterprise in the nineteenth century (Horwitz, 1977). Tushnet 
argues that Horwitz must make the relationship between doctrinal change and 
economic change an object of study in its own right employing both theory and 
data appropriate to the class relationships which mediated the link between 
judges and the economy. Tushnet suggests, as we do, that appropriate research 
can be done only be going beyond descriptions of doctrine in order to under-
stand its significance and therefore how it was created and with what effect. 
{Tushnet, 1978: 105-110). 
39. Indeed, the Conference was formed because the relationships between legal 
system and society are open to question and debate. Conference research, 
therefore, cannot, and does not, assume that questions such as these are settled, 
even in Marxist theory. 
40. We would be remiss if we did not also appreciate other works by Klare which we 
believe present the group-relational, self-reflective analysis of law which the 
Conference should strive for (see esp. Klare, 1979b ). Interestingly, in a recent 
piece on labor and civil rights law (1982) and the failure of these movements to 
come to grips with a common set of concerns, Klare much more self-consciously 
. clarifies what his analysis of doctrine can not explain. 
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